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Federalized Res Judicata
Ronan E. Degnant
The recognition due in the courts of one state to the judicial pro-
ceedings of another is an essential element of the American Union.
Article IV, § 1, of the Constitution requires that "Full Faith and
Credit" be given in each state to the "public Acts, Records, and
judicial Proceedings of every other State." The recognition of judg-
ments when a federal court is involved-the effect of state judgments
on proceedings in federal courts and the effect of federal judgments in
state courts and other federal courts-is not governed explicitly by the
terms of Article IV, but is no less important. Still, it is a problem that
has received far less attention and is not yet thoroughly worked out.
Four developments of a generation ago have created new uncertain-
ties and spawned several dubious lines of decision. These four develop-
ments, almost concurrent in time though probably accidentally so,
were the substantial expansion of the judicial conception of what is
included within the scope of a claim or cause of action;' the influen-
tial decision of the California Supreme Court in Bernhard v. Bank of
America National Trust g- Savings Association2 that mutuality of es-
toppel was no longer required for collateral estoppel effect to be given
to judgments; the decision in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins,3 requiring
federal courts in diversity cases to look to state law as state courts had
made it rather than to their own independent conception of the com-
mon law; and the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
effective in 1938, the same year as Erie.
t Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley.
1. Details of this transformation will be explored at pp. 764, 766-67, 771-73 infra. For
the present, it is sufficient to contrast RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS §§ 61-67 (1942) with
RrSTATFmENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 61, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973) and the
appended Reporter's Note. One feature to be considered is the effect of the expanded
concept of a "claim" on the ancillary jurisdiction of federal courts. See United Mine
Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
2. 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942) (Traynor, J.).
3. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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At the outset, I venture a yet undocumented assertion. Courts and
judges of the 19th century shared a common understanding of res
judicata in terms of what a judgment decided.4 The questions they
asked about res judicata were largely, if not entirely, about what
kind of proceedings were entitled to respect and enforcement. Because
this common agreement no longer exists, the modem question is better
phrased as: to what faith and credit is a particular judgment entitled?
As this article discusses the statutes and cases bearing on the question,
a central theme will, I hope, emerge: the effect of a judgment rendered
by any court within the United States on judicial proceedings in any
other jurisdiction is in the last analysis a matter of federal law.
Before embarking upon that quest, I must first account for a his-
torical development that the Constitution itself may permit, but cer-
tainly does not require in its words. Why does any faith and credit at
all attach to federal judgments?
I. A Historical Survey
Two historical sketches are necessary background-one of the evolu-
tion of the constitutional concept of full faith and credit and the other
of the development of the full faith and credit doctrine between state
and federal courts. The first is brief because my own research has
uncovered nothing new; the summary provided here for readers not
familiar with the scattered literature is a composite of the work of
others.5 The second sketch is more expansive because it is, I hope,
more original and is central to a full understanding of the develop-
ments of the past 40 years.
A full faith and credit clause bearing that name first appeared in
the Fourth Article of Confederation. It was similar both in phrasing
4. As illustration, see 2 H. BLAcK, JUDGMENTs §§ 500-07 (1891) for a sense of what res
judicata meant to courts at that time. Differences in application could doubtless be
found, but the rules were unitary and uniform. The major exception was Louisiana,
with its civil law tradition. No doubt this accounts for the disproportionate number of
Louisiana cases in which res judicata issues have arisen, as the text of this article will
disclose. The Fifth Circuit is especially alert to these problems, having faced them often.
See, e.g., Maher v. City of New Orleans, 516 F.2d 1051, 1055-58 (5th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3685 (U.S. June 1, 1976).
5. A. EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICr OF LAWS 166-67 (1962); H. GoODRICH 8L E. SCOLEs, CON-
FLiCr OF LAWS 394 (4th ed. 1964); Cook, The Powers of Congress Under the Full Faith
and Credit Clause, 28 YALE L.J. 421, 434 (1919); Costigan, The History of the Adoption
of Section 1 of Article IV of the United States Constitution and a Consideration of the
Effect on Judgments of That Section and of Federal Legislation, 4 COLUM. L. REv. 470,
481 (1904); Radin, The Authenticated Full Faith and Credit Clause: Its History, 39 ILL.
L. REV. 1 (1944); Ross, Full Faith and Credit in a Federal System, 20 MINN. L. REv. 140,
140-48 (1935); Comment, Res Judicata in the Federal Courts: Application of Federal or
State Law: Possible Differences Between the Two, 51 CORNELL L.Q. 96 (1965).
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and content to the one found in Article IV of the present Constitution.
The Article of Confederation lacked, however, the reference to "public
Acts" (with which we will not be concerned), and it contained no
clause permitting legislative implementation.
6
The actual term "full faith and credit" was employed in the English
language long before the Articles of Confederation, 7 but it seems to
have little ancestry in legal usage or in the area of res judicata8 English
courts were inclined to respect and often followed judgments of
foreign courts, but did not speak of according those judgments (or
''sentences," in continental usage) any "faith" or "credit," "full" or
otherwise.9 Two pieces of colonial legislation, in Connecticut1 ° and
Massachusetts, 1' provided some res judicata effect for judgments from
the courts of other colonies, but employed neither the conjunctive
"and" nor the adjective "full." So the origin of a legal phrase of great
importance to our federal system remains obscure.
The Constitution provides only that "each State" shall honor the
judicial proceedings "of every other State." And it is only as to "such
Acts, Records and judicial Proceedings" and "the Effect thereof" that
the Congress is given an implementing power. But in 1790, so close to
the adoption of the Constitution that it has been described by the
Supreme Court as "contemporaneous,"' 12 Congress required by statute
that federal courts accord the judgments and proceedings of state
courts the same "faith and credit" they enjoyed by "law or usage" in
the court of rendition.' 3 Later, in 1804, Congress added what is, sub-
stantially, the present language on how the existence of the first judg-
6. See Radin, supra note 5, at 2-12.
7. See D. MELLINKOFF, THE LANGUAGE OF THE LAW 348 (1963).
8. Ross, supra note 5, at 140 & n.4, attempts to trace the origin of the term in legal
usage and finds an interesting 16th century translation of the Bull of Demarcation of
Pope Alexander VI, dividing South America between Spain and Portugal, wh.ich employs
the expression "same fayth and credite." But Ross points out that it is a less than faith-
ful rendition of the original wording, although it may convey the idea which the Latin
expresses.
9. See Ross, supra note 5, at 14041. Radin, supra note 5, at 13, quotes Lord Notting-
ham in Cottington's Case, 2 Swans. 326, 36 Eng. Rep. 640 (Ch. 1678), as saying, "It is
against the law of nations not to give credit to the judgments and sentences of foreign
countries. ... I have located a dissenting opinion of Lord Chief Justice Eyere saying
that when foreign judgments were sued upon, English courts gave them only prima
facie effect, but when they were raised defensively, "we give entire faith and credit to
the sentences of foreign courts, and consider them as conclusive upon us." Phillips v.
Hunter, 2 H. BI. 402, 409, 126 Eng. Rep. 618, 622 (Ex. 1795) (emphasis added). The
phrase is similar but not identical, and the date too late to be of assistance.
10. See A. EHRENZWEIG, supra note 5, at 167.
11. See Radin, supra note 5, at 17-18.
12. See M'Elmoyle v. Cohen, 38 US. (13 Pet.) 312, 326 (1839). That case is a state-
to-state rather than a state-to-federal application.
13. Act of May 26, 1790, ch. XI, 1 Stat. 122.
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ment should be proved.14 (The statute is presently codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738.) 15 The nearly contemporaneous enactment of this "imple-
menting statute" suggests there was an unexpressed assumption that
if federal courts inferior to the Supreme Court were created (the if
because it was not at all clear to the Constitutional Convention that
lower federal courts were needed 6), the power to prescribe what ef-
fect those courts must give to state court judgments was at least in-
ferentially included in the congressional authority.
Conspicuously lacking in either the Constitution or the statute of
1790 is a reverse clause-that state courts are required to give some
recognition, some faith and credit, to the judgments and proceedings
of federal courts. On their face neither Article IV, § 1, of the Constitu-
tion nor the statute compels the state courts to give any respect, much
less full faith and credit, to federal judicial proceedings.
From where, then, comes the clearly established rule that state
courts must give full faith and credit to the proceedings of federal
courts? That this is the rule is beyond doubt, and the state courts
have generally accepted it. Indeed, the only semblance of resistance
has appeared when there seemed to be something "wrong" with the
judgments presented; it has never stemmed from a refusal by state
courts to accept the general proposition that federal judgments as such
are as binding on them under res judicata principles as are the judg-
ments rendered by courts within their own system.1 7 The Supreme
14. Act of Mar. 27, 1804, ch. 56, 2 Stat. 298.
15. The statute was slightly modified in 1948, substituting "Possession of the United
States" for "of any country subject to the jurisdiction of the United States." The
pertinent language of the statute now reads:
The records and judicial proceedings of any court of any such State, Territory or
Possession, or copies thereof, shall be proved or admitted in other courts within
the United States and its Territories and Possessions by the attestation of the clerk
and seal of the court annexed, if a seal exists, together with a certificate of a judge
of the court that the said attestation is in proper form.
Such Acts, records and judicial proceedings or copies thereof, so authenticated,
shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States and
its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of such
State, Territory or Possession from which they are taken.
16. See P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRo, 9- H. WECHSLER, HART 9&- WECHSLER'S THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 11-12 (2d ed. 1973); C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS
2 (2d ed. 1970).
17. Even prior to the elaboration of such a rule by the Supreme Court in the late
19th century, the state courts in general gave res judicata effect to federal court judg-
ments. I have found no instance in which a state court even noted that it was not bound
by either the Constitution or the statute to respect federal adjudications. In fact, they
seldom cite any authority other than the general principle of res judicata, even when
they are reluctant to accept the federal disposition.
A sampling of cases follows: Semple v. Hagar, 27 Cal. 163, 170 (1865), appeal dismissed, 71
U.S. (4 Wall.) 431 (1866) (where a federal court had already ruled on the validity of a Mexi-
can land grant against charges of fraud: "[C]an the Courts of this State set aside, or indi-
rectly review the decisions of the Federal Courts? This is not an open question."); Harrison
v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 83 Ind. 575, 577 (1882) (federal judgment on seniority of
744
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Court has consistently assumed that the implementing statute of 1790
required such recognition.
The major difficulty with this accepted state of the law is that, as
we have seen, it rests on no explicit constitutional or legislative
authority. The literature which has explored the problem adds little
to an understanding of either the puzzle or the result. The present
inquiry is therefore necessary, but fortunately the cases it must ad-
dress are few and were decided over a period of only about 25 years.
The Supreme Court never referred to the problem before the Civil
War, and the now-established rule had crystallized before 1900.
The earliest discussion I have found is that of Justice Bradley in
Dupasseur v. Rochereau.'8 Previously, in 1865, a Louisiana federal
court sitting in alienage diversity had foreclosed a mortgage. The issue
posed in Dupasseur was whether Rochereau, who was not named a
party in the federal proceeding, could litigate the priority of his mort-
gage on the same property in a subsequent Louisiana state case. The
opinion says:
The only effect that can be justly claimed for the judgment in
the Circuit Court of the United States, is such as would belong to
judgments of the State courts rendered under similar circum-
stances.' 9
lien attacked in state court: "It would be strange, indeed, if the State courts should have
a right to review the judgments of the Federal tribunals. It can not be necessary to cite
authorities in support of this principle .... "); Thomson v. County of Lee, 22 Iowa (1
Stiles) 206 (1867) (Illinois federal judgment sued on in Iowa, and defendant argued that
federal judgments were rendered by "foreign and not domestic tribunals." Id. at 207.
The court answered: "(S]till we find, upon an examination of the Constitution and
laws of the United States, and the decisions of the courts construing and applying them,
that the Circuit Courts of the United States are not to be regarded as foreign tribunals
by the courts of States other than that in which the federal court was holden which
rendered the judgment .... ." Id. at 209); Pigot v. Davis, 10 N.C. (3 Hawks) 25, 27
(1824) (action of detinue brought for slave sold under judgment of federal court for
North Carolina. According to North Carolina judge earlier judgment was "pronounced
by a Court as stable, and as strongly constituted by the Constitution and laws of the
country, as the Court we sit in, and it is a Court too of competent jurisdiction").
Even under extreme provocation this view was followed. In Ames v. Slater, 27 Minn.
70, 75, 6 N.W. 418, 419 (1880), a Kentucky corporation had filed a probate claim in a
Minnesota court, where the claim was denied; the denial was approved by the Minnesota
supreme court. Thereafter the corporation sued the administrator in the federal court
in Minnesota, obtaining a large judgment. The Minnesota court held that it must
respect the federal judgment even though the federal court's failure to honor Minnesota's
own prior adjudication was "erroneous." The federal judgment was "valid as it stands."
References to the federal-to-state problem did not appear in early editions of Story's
Conflict of Laws. The editor who prepared the fourth edition from Story's own manu-
script added the following, in brackets, to indicate that he was embellishing upon
Story's wording: "[And the same rule applies to judgments of the Circuit Courts of the
United States, when relied upon in a State Court.]" Cited in support are two state court
cases. J. STORtY, CONFLICT OF LAws § 609 (4th ed. 1852).
18. 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 130 (1874).
19. Id. at 135.
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Since the court sat in diversity, "its proceedings were had in accor-
dance with the forms and course of proceeding in the State courts.
'" 20
Not having been a party in the federal case, Rochereau would not be
bound under general notions of res judicata. Because there was
nothing "peculiar" 21 to Louisiana law which would have bound him
to a similar state court judgment, the federal judgment did not bind
him either.
The next case, Embry v. Palmer,22 is the one most often cited for
the rule that state courts must give full faith and credit to federal
adjudications. It is also easily misunderstood and is worth quoting
from at length to show why. The Supreme Court of Errors of Con-
necticut had refused to honor a District of Columbia judgment, not
because it was a federal judgment, but because of a persuasive showing
that it had been obtained by an extraordinary combination of mis-
leading behavior by the plaintiff and an excusable omission by the
defendant. 23 The Court first quoted from the implementing statute
as it then read:
[The statute] provides that the records and judicial proceedings,
not only of the courts of any State, but of any Territory, or of
any country subject to the jurisdiction of the United States ...
"shall have such faith and credit given to them, in every court
within the United States, as they have by law or usage in the
courts of the State from which they are taken;" . . . .21
And then the Court stated:
So far as this statutory provision relates to the effect to be given
to the judicial proceedings of the States, it is founded on art. 4,
sect. 1, of the Constitution, which, however, does not extend to
the other cases covered by the statute. The power to prescribe
what effect shall be given to the judicial proceedings of the courts
of the United States is conferred by other provisions of the Consti-
tution, such as those which declare the extent of the judicial power
20. Id. The Court attached no significance to the fact that the federal circuit court
proceedings might have been regarded as in equity. In matters of equity, the procedure
of federal courts sitting in Louisiana was distinctly federal, although for a reason dif-
ferent from other states. Under the Act of May 26, 1824, ch. 181, 4 Stat. 62, Louisiana
federal courts were made conformable to state practice and procedure in "civil causes,"
held to include both law and equity. Livingston v. Story, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 632, 656-57, 660
(1835). However, because Louisiana had no state courts of chancery, and thus no state
rules of equity practice, federal equity practice was held to govern in their absence. Id.
at 657, 660; Gaines v. Relf, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 9, 14-16 (1841).
21. 88 U.S. at 137.
22. 107 U.S. 3 (1882).
23. The defendant had allegedly refrained from raising a good defense in the District
of Columbia action because of false assurances by the plaintiff. See id. at 12.
24. Id. at 9.
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of the United States, which authorize all legislation necessary and
proper for executing the powers vested by the Constitution in the
government of the United States, or in any department or officer
thereof, and which declare the supremacy of the authority of the
national government within the limits of the Constitution. As part
of its general authority, the power to give effect to the judgments
of its courts is coextensive with its territorial jurisdiction. That
the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia is a court of the
United States, results from the right of exclusive legislation over
the District which the Constitution has given to Congress. Ac-
cordingly, the judgments of the courts of the United States have
invariably been recognized as upon the same footing, so far as
concerns the obligation created by them, with domestic judgments
of the States, wherever rendered and wherever sought to be en-
forced....
The rule for determining what effect shall be given to such
judgments is that declared by this court, in respect to the faith
and credit to be given to the judgments of State courts in the
courts of other States, in the case of M'Elmoyle v. Cohen, 13 Pet.
312, 326, where it was said: "They are record evidence of a debt,
or judgments of record, to be contested only in such way as judg-
ments of record may be; and, consequently, are conclusive upon
the defendant in every State, except for such causes as would be
sufficient to set aside the judgment in the courts of the State in
which it was rendered."
25
The Court's reasoning is perplexing: it suggests that because the
statute requires states to recognize judgments of territorial courts, and
because territorial courts are courts "of the United States," the
statute thereby requires the states to recognize the judgments of all
"courts of the United States." But the result seems plain: federal judg-
ments are as powerful in state courts as are judgments of other states.
The next significant Supreme Court case arose from concurrent
litigation in federal and state courts in Louisiana over the continued
validity of the monopoly on butchering sustained in the famous
Slaughter-House Cases.20 A federal circuit court found the monopoly
still valid in a decision that was later reversed by the Supreme Court for
reasons not pertinent here.27 Prior to its reversal, however, a Louisiana
court in a suit between the same litigants awarded damages for ma-
licious prosecution, despite the Louisiana rule that a party who relied
upon an outstanding decision of a tribunal with jurisdiction of the
parties had an absolute defense to malicious prosecution-i.e., good
25. Id. at 9-10 (citations omitted).
26. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
27. Butchers' Union Slaughter-House and Live-Stock Landing Co. v. Crescent City
Live-Stock Landing and Slaughter-House Co., 111 U.S. 746 (1883).
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faith-even if the decision were later reversed. Hearing an appeal from
this award in Crescent City Live Stock Co. v. Butchers' Union
Slaughter-House Co., the Supreme Court cited Embry for the propo-
sition that
judgments and decrees of the Circuit Court of the United States,
sitting in a particular state, in the courts of that state, are to
be accorded such effect, and such effect only, as would be ac-
corded in similar circumstances to the judgments and decrees of
a state tribunal of equal authority.28
On this basis, the state award was vacated even though the Court had
previously recognized error in the federal decree upon which the de-
fendant in the suit for malicious prosecution had relied in Louisiana
state court. The decision was not the usual invocation of the principle
of res judicata under the name of full faith and credit, but a ruling
that full faith and credit forbade any rule that discriminated against
a federal judgment by making it a less effective defense than a state
court judgment.
The holdings in Embry and the cases following it2" are more under-
standable than the explanations given. One can well ask what compels
the conclusion just quoted, tht the scope and effect of a federal
judgment are identical to those of a judgment of a court of the state
in which the federal judgment is rendered. Metcalf v. Watertown,0
which was probably the last attempt by the Court to elucidate the
effect states must give to federal adjudications, merely repeats 1 the
general language of Embry v. Palmer. The Court clearly read the
implementing statute as prescribing the effect to be given federal
judgments, despite its lack of any explicit provision to that end, and as
28. 120 U.S. 141, 147 (1887).
29. Hancock Nat'l Bank v. Farnum, 176 U.S. 640 (1900); Supreme Lodge, Knights of
Pythias v. Meyer, 265 U.S. 30, 33 (1924).
30. 153 U.S. 671 (1894).
31. So far as that section relates to the effect to be given to the judicial proceedings
of the States, it is founded on article IV, section 1, of the Constitution; but the
power to prescribe what effect shall be given to the judicial proceedings of the courts
of the United States is conferred by other provisions of the Constitution, such as
those which declare the extent of the judicial power of the United States; which
authorize all legislation necessary and proper for executing the powers vested by the
Constitution in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer
thereof, and which declare the supremacy of the power of the national government
within the limits of the Constitution.
Id. at 676. Compare p. 747 supra. The statement is only dictum since the Metcalf Court,
after considering whether or not Wisconsin could provide a shorter statute of limitations
for enforcement of Wisconsin federal judgments than it did for Wisconsin state court
judgments, found by heroic construction that the Wisconsin statute did not so intend.
On whether a shorter limitation period for enforcement would be valid, see Watkins v.
Conway, 385 U.S. 188, 189 (1966) (dictum that state cannot limit its enforcement of sister
state judgments to shorter period than that allowed judgments of its own courts).
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"implementing" in this respect clauses of the Constitution other than
Article IV, § 1, most notably the power to create courts inferior to
the Supreme Court. Even more remarkable than this construction of
the Constitution and statute is the total silence of the Congress, which
has never, even to this day, explicitly addressed the effect to be given
federal judgments.
The rule which has become law was stated most recently by Justice
Reed in Stoll v. Gottlieb.3 2 The Supreme Court of Illinois had refused
to honor the decree of a bankruptcy court in Illinois on the ground
(accurate as far as it went) that the decree in question exceeded the
bankruptcy court's subject matter jurisdiction. But that objection had
been raised and decided, however wrongly, in the bankruptcy court.
Reed's opinion says of the implementing statute that it
is broader than the authority granted by Article Four, section one,
of the Constitution to prescribe the manner of proof and the
effect of the judicial proceedings of states. Under it the judg-
ments and decrees of the federal courts in a state are declared to
have the same dignity in the courts of that state as those of its own
courts in a like case and under similar circumstances. 3
The opinion later makes the puzzling suggestion that because there
was a federal question involved (bankruptcy), "[t]he problem before
the Supreme Court of Illinois was not one of full faith and credit but
of res judicata."34 Why this should be true is not explained, and the
difference, if it is one, is not followed up in other cases.
This survey of the development of the rule has been kept short be-
cause its purpose is not to show that the Court was willfully wrong in
doing what it did, but to establish that it was wantonly right. By
strength of arm and sleight of hand, it achieved a result that is indis-
pensable to federalism. In the words of Chief Justice Stone, the pur-
pose of full faith and credit is to "establish throughout the federal
system the salutary principle of the common law that a litigation once
pursued to judgment shall be as conclusive of the rights of the parties
in every other court as in that where the judgment was rendered."35
Like the commerce clause, it "became a nationally unifying force."3 6
Although Stone was writing in a state-to-state context, the principle is
as powerful in state-federal relations. Were there no such rule, it would
be necessary to invent one-so invent it the Supreme Court did.
32. 305 U.S. 165 (1938).
33. Id. at 170.
34. Id. at 171.
35. Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 439 (1943).
36. Id.
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The early history of full faith and credit discloses no dispute or con-
fusion arising over federal judgments tendered in other federal courts.
The problem, discussed below under the heading "The Effect and
Scope of Federal Judgments,"37 was not posed directly until 1931.
It is modem law, not history.
II. State Judgments in Federal Courts
I noted in the introduction that the Erie decision has given rise to
a questionable line of authority. Must a federal court follow the law
of the state in which it sits on the scope and effect to be given to that
state's own judgments and to the judgments of other states? As will be
shown, the answer is certainly "yes" to the first and "no" to the
second. Yet most of the relevant decisions seem to conclude that there
is only one issue presented, and that it is resolved by the Erie
doctrine. That is erroneous; Erie has no voice on the issue, which
should be framed in different terms. The correct answer is found in
the implementing statute. Fortunately the faulty doctrine is not yet
fully entrenched; the Supreme Court has noted the problem, but has
not yet ruled on it. And at least a few lower court cases point in the
right direction.
The Supreme Court appears to have first taken cognizance of the
problem in Heiser v. Woodruff:38
We need not consider whether, apart from the requirement of
the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution, the rule of
res judicata applied in the federal courts, in diversity of citizen-
ship cases, under the doctrine of Erie ... can be other than that
of the state in which the federal court sits. 9
As this quote suggests, the question raised within it was found not to
bear on the outcome. 40 The other Supreme Court notation is much
more recent. Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois
Foundation41 marked the Supreme Court's first consideration of Cali-
fornia's abandonment of the traditional requirement of mutuality
(identity of parties) for the invocation of collateral estoppel. Noting the
37. See pp. 756-70 infra.
38. 327 U.S. 726 (1946).
39. Id. at 731-32.
40. A money judgment had been filed as a claim in a bankruptcy proceeding. It was
objected that the judgment had been fraudulently obtained (although the issue of fraud
itself had previously been litigated and decided). The Court actually ruled that the
question was not one of the effect of judgments but of the provability and allowability
of claims, matters regulated by the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 103(a) (1970).
41. 402 U.S. 313 (1971).
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trend in the field from Justice Traynor's Bernhard decision to the
present, the Court said:
Many federal courts, exercising both federal question and diversity
jurisdiction, are in accord [on dispensing with mutuality] unless
in a diversity case bound to apply a conflicting state rule requir-
ing mutuality.
42
Following this statement in Blonder-Tongue's text is a string of
citations to cases, many of them discussed below, which seem to bear
out the principle that federal courts in diversity cases may be required
to conform to state law on the scope or effect of a judgment. Never-
theless, this statement in the opinion is certainly not a holding
(Blonder-Tongue itself arose entirely under federal question jurisdic-
tion-a patent infringement-rather than diversity jurisdiction) and
should not even be regarded as dictum. It is merely a factual observa-
tion-most federal courts have said that in diversity cases they are
bound to apply the law of judgments of the state in which they sit.
This observation leaves open two questions. Are federal courts so
bound? And if so, why? The answer to the first question is that federal
courts in diversity are bound to reach the same result as the forum
state would, but for a reason unrelated to the Erie doctrine. The
implementing statute from 1790 until today has compelled the federal
courts to give to the judgment of the court of any state, not only those
of the state in which it sits, the same full faith and credit that the
judgment has "by law or usage" in the court of rendition.43 The
statute requires similar recognition by any state court. Thus, by the
terms of the statute, Pennsylvania courts, both state and federal, must
give to New York judgments the effect that New York would give
them, not whatever effect Pennsylvania decides they deserve. Similarly,
Pennsylvania federal courts must give to Pennsylvania judgments the
same effect Pennsylvania would give. Even in this latter case, the
reason is not Erie,44 which most courts cite to support the conclusion,
but the full faith and credit statute.
Reference to the Erie doctrine in the situation where both state and
federal courts are located in the same state can probably be dismissed
as a form of harmless error. But there are cases where the error is not
harmless, and discussion of but a few will demonstrate why.
42. Id. at 325 (footnote omitted).
43. See note 15 supra.
44. The Rules of Decision Act provides that state law shall supply the rule of decision
in civil actions in federal courts "except where . . . Acts of Congress otherwise require
or provide." 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1970) (emphasis added). The full faith and credit statute,
28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1970), is of course one such superseding act.
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Behrens v. Skelly45 was a suit in a Pennsylvania federal court upon
an arbitration award reduced to judgment in a New York supreme
court. The issue was whether the Pennsylvania defendants were in
"privity" with the New York litigants. Judge Mars said:
In the present case jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizen-
ship. We must, therefore, determine in accordance with the con-
flict rules of Pennsylvania what law is to be looked to for ascer-
taining whether the defendants are in privity with [the New York
litigants].
46
Finding no Pennsylvania conflicts rule about privity, he used the first
Restatement of Conflict of Laws § 450, comment d, as Pennsylvania
law; it said, in substance, that the law of the court of rendition de-
termines the question of privity. But he used the Restatement as a
Pennsylvania conflicts rule, which was entirely beside the point, rather
than requiring the federal court to look directly to New York privity
law without squinting through the spectacles of Pennsylvania.
A similar holding by another highly respected court in Eisel v.
Columbia Packing Co.47 illustrates the same error. Eisel, who had
purchased some packaged ham from a Connecticut retailer, sued the
retailer and the Massachusetts packer of the product in a Connecticut
state court. The packer pleaded that he had not been properly served
with process. Before this could be decided, Eisel chose to proceed with
his suit against the retailer and lost upon a finding that the ham had
not caused his illness. Thereafter he sued the Massachusetts packer in
a Massachusetts federal district court. The packer objected that Eisel
was barred by collateral estoppel. Judge Wyzanski said: "This being
a diversity jurisdiction case the substantive rules of collateral estoppel
are governed by the law of Massachusetts." 48 Looking at general law,
he found a "growing tendency," to which Massachusetts was "hospi-
table," to apply collateral estoppel against one who had sued another
defendant on the same issue in a forum of plaintiff's choice and had,
after full and fair trial on the merits, lost.
In this analysis, Homer nodded. Judge Wyzanski should have looked
to the law of Connecticut, the state of rendition. On a matter as much
in flux in 1960 as the doctrine of mutuality, the result under Eisel's
approach could have been right only by accident, for Article IV of
the Constitution and the implementing statute require Massachusetts
45. 173 F.2d 715 (8d Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 821 (1949).
46. Id. at 717.
47. 181 F. Supp. 298 (D. Mass. 1960).
48. Id. at 299.
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itself to look to Connecticut law. But what Massachusetts may think
about mutuality in wholly domestic cases is at best only an indication
of what Connecticut would hold. It was Connecticut's "hospitality,"
not that of Massachusetts, which was crucial.
These two cases can be reinforced by a handful of holdings and a
multitude of quotations to the same effect. Those are relegated to the
notes40 because the point has been made. The approach which relies
on Erie has become the federal rule. It has been adopted by several
circuit courts; the Third Circuit especially, which early adopted the
rule abandoning mutuality,50 has frequently relied on the Erie
approach.
Although a substantial majority of federal decisions on this point
have followed the Erie analysis, at least a handful have not. One excep-
49. Arranged by circuits, the decisions are: Standard Accident Ins. Co. v. Doiron, 170
F.2d 206, 207 (1st Cir. 1948); Ritchie v. Landau, 475 F.2d 151, 154 (2d Cir. 1973); Lynne
Carol Fashions, Inc. v. Cranston Print Works Co., 453 F.2d 1177, 1179 (3d Cir. 1972)
(dictum only, since state and federal rules were found to be the same); Kimmel v.
Yankee Lines, 224 F.2d 644, 645 (3d Cir. 1955); Blum v. William Goldman Theatres, 174
F.2d 914, 915 (3d Cir. 1949); Hornstein v. Kramer Bros. Freight Lines, 133 F.2d 143, 144
(3d Cir. 1943); Graves v. Associated Transp. Inc., 344 F.2d 894, 896 (4th Cir. 1950);
Breeland v. Security Ins. Co., 421 F.2d 918, 921 (5th Cir. 1969); American Mannex Corp.
v. Rozands, 462 F.2d 688, 689 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1040 (1972) (with warning
that in some unspecified cases "other well-defined federal policies may compete with those
policies underlying section 1738"; case may be an amalgam of Erie and the implementing
statute); Hackler v. Indianapolis & Southeastern Trailways, Inc., 437 F.2d 360, 361 (6th
Cir. 1971); Machris v. Murray, 397 F.2d 74, 75 (6th Cir. 1968); Hardy v. Bankers Life &
Cas. Co., 232 F.2d 205, 208-09 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 984 (1956) ("Since juris-
diction rests on diversity of citizenship, Illinois law as to defendants' liability governs the
decisions in this cause [citing, inter alia, Erie). In accord with the Illinois law, we must
determine the effect of the judgment under attack by applying the law of Minnesota.");
Gerrard v. Larsen, 517 F.2d 1127, 1131-32 (8th Cir. 1975) (raises the issue but finds decision
of it unnecessary); R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Newby, 153 F.2d 819, 820 (9th Cir. 1946).
A comprehensive but not entirely reliable annotation in 19 A.L.R. FED. 709 (1974)
collects district court decisions as well. An excellent opinion, though wrongly relying on
Erie, was written by Judge Levet in Pallen v. Allied Vanl Lines, Inc., 223 F. Supp. 394
(S.D.N.Y. 1963). A Florida state court judgment was invoked as precluding relitigation of
several issues. The judge noted, "The determination of which law is to govern .. .
begins with the inevitable citation of the, Erie trilogy." I4. at 395. Finding that issue
preclusion was outcome determinative and that there was no countervailing federal policy,
the court looked to New York law and found that it would apply the collateral estoppel
rule of Florida, the state of rendition. Cited in support is REsTATEMENT OF CONFU c OF
LAws § 450 (1934).
The error in some of the cases here listed may be of the harmless variety because they
involved a state judgment called into question in a federal court of the same state.
Whether it is Erie which controls or full faith and credit, the result would be the same.
For example, in the First Circuit decision in Doiron, supra, applying an Erie analysis may
still have given the right result because the state court judgment was pleaded in a federal
court of the same state. Perhaps the First Circuit redeemed itself when it used full faith
and credit exclusively in Wayside Transp. Co. v. Marcell's Motor Express, Inc., 284 F.2d
868 (Ist Cir. 1960).
50. Bruszewski v. United States, 181 F.2d 419 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 865
(1950).
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tion, cases where diversity is not involved, will be discussed laterA'
But a few federal courts have perceived that no Erie problem is ever
presented, even in diversity. One case came to this position perforce (it
was decided prior to Erie) and recognized that the only question was
one of full faith and credit.5 A major post-Erie case is Hazen Research,
Inc. v. Omega Minerals, Inc.,53 where a Colorado state court judgment
was sued upon in federal court in Alabama. Ignoring Erie, the Fifth
Circuit applied a straightforward full faith and credit analysis. "[W]e
have the rather anomalous situation of a federal diversity court decid-
ing a controversy in which Congress has, by the exercise of its express
and implied powers, federalized all relevant legal questions-a diversity
case in which there are no issues of forum state law." 54 Still another
such case comes from the Third Circuit. In Clyde v. Hodge,55 without
citing any of its Erie-line cases, the court said:
Unquestionably, the courts of the United States must give full
faith and credit to the final judgments of state courts. Constitution
of the United States, Article IV, Section 1; 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738;
.... The district court was therefore compelled to give the Ohio
judgment the same force and effect in this action as it would
have been accorded by the Ohio courts.56
In the light of this command, the court held that since Ohio still
preserved the rule of mutuality for collateral estoppel, certain issues
were not barred in the Pennsylvania federal district court.
Explicit in a few of the Erie-based cases,57 and implidit in many
more, is the notion that the rule of res judicata or collateral estoppel
is "substantive" rather than "procedural" for purposes of the Erie
doctrine. That classification is unimportant in the sense that the
application of Erie under established case law does not turn on whether
the label is substance or procedure. If "outcome determinative" is the
relevant test under the Rules of Decision Act as construed in Erie,"s
hardly anything is more dispositive than the doctrine of res judicata.
51. See pp. 759-60 infra.
52. Coppedge v. Clinton, 72 F.2d 531, 536 (10th Cir. 1934) (citing what is now 28
U.S.C. § 1738 (1970)).
53. 497 F.2d 151 (5th Cir. 1974). Another example is Wayside Transp. Co. v. Marcell's
Motor Express, Inc., 284 F.2d 868 (1st Cir. 1960).
54. 497 F.2d at 153 n.l.
55. 413 F.2d 48 (3d Cir. 1969).
56. Id. at 50.
57. E.g., Lynne Carol Fashions, Inc. v. Cranston Print Works Co., 453 F.2d 1177, 1181
(3d Cir. 1972) (Since mutuality seems outcome determinative, "Guaranty Trust Co. v.
York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945)J would seem to require application of the state rule."); Pallen
v. United Van Lines, Inc., 223 F. Supp. 394, 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
58. See Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
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But a later section of this article will argue that even the out-
come determinative standard is not controlling-federal courts can and
should have a rule of res judicata not dependent upon the law of the
states in which they sit.59 Direct recourse to federal law, which avoids
the "outcome" problem, is compelled by the Rules of Decision Act
itself.60 Under its terms federal courts must follow state rules of
decision unless the Constitution, federal laws, or treaties "otherwise
require or provide." The implementing statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738,
does explicitly provide otherwise, and Erie is irrelevant.
Some of the cases 1 and literature 2 touching on this subject have
made it appear that there is a delicate balancing problem involved in
choosing between Erie and full faith and credit. One case that treats
this problem does not fall into the trap of balancing, but registers the
common uncertainty about the proper choice of the law. In Gambocz
v. YelencsiCs, 63 which was not a diversity case, Judge Aldisert said, in
a footnote:
Where one or both suits have been brought under federal di-
versity jurisdiction, the collateral estoppel and res judicata laws
of the forum state(s) may become applicable through Erie ....
the full faith and credit clause, or 28 U.S.C. § 1738. 64
There is no such choice and no delicate balance to be struck. Full
faith and credit has dominating constitutional and statutory force and
must prevail.
III. The Effect and Scope of Federal Judgments
The Supreme Court has held that federal court judgments are en-
titled to full faith and credit in the states, although, as we have seen,
neither the Constitution nor the implementing statute specifies that
59. See p. 769 infra.
60. See note 44 supra. A special problem with state judgments offered as collateral
estoppel in federal courts arises when a state court has incidentally adjudicated an issue
which is ordinarily one of exclusive federal jurisdiction. Should the federal court be
bound by the state determination? The cases are few in number and inconsistent both in
analysis and result. See Comment, Collateral Estoppel Effect of State Court Judgment in
Federal Antitrust Suits, 51 CALIF. L. Rav. 955 (1963); Note, Res Judicata: Exclusive
Federal Jurisdiction and the Effect of Prior State-Court Determinations, 53 VA. L. REV.
1360 (1967).
61. See, e.g., Lynne Carol Fashions, Inc. v. Cranston Print Works Co., 453 F.2d 1177,
1181-82 (3d Cir. 1972) (choice of state or federal collateral estoppel rule is outcome
determinative, but state rule, in giving estoppel effect to arbitration award, would work
against "strong federal policy" protecting Seventh Amendment right to jury trial).
62. See Vestal, Res Judicata Preclusion by Judgment: The Law Applied in Federal
Courts, 66 Mic. L. Rxv. 1723, 1726, 1728 (1968); Comment, supra note 5, at 97-98.
63. 468 F.2d 837 (3d Cir. 1972).
64. Id. at 841 n.4.
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result in so many words. The Court also has told us in Baldwin v. Iowa
State Traveling Men's Association65 that full faith and credit does not
control when federal judgments are tendered as causes of action or
pleas in bar in other federal courts,00 but that the doctrine of res
judicata does.67 The results are seemingly the same as if full faith and
credit did apply.
A doctrine that a judgment is binding, however, does nothing to
delineate its scope. There remains the question of what issues, and
what persons, are concluded or bound. The answer to this question
has varied through three stages. The first stage, of pre-Rules con-
formity, is now pure history. The second was established not long ago
but is now in decline; the third is still emerging with contours far
from clear.
To describe the first figuration involves some repetition of the in-
quiry of Part I. The earliest analyses of the scope of federal judgments
concerned judgments of the then federal circuit courts tendered in
courts of the state in which the federal court sat. The holdings about
the scope or effect of such judgments were clear-the federal judgment
had to be treated as neither less nor more binding than those issued by
the courts of the state.
Thus, in Dupasseur, a diversity judgment by a federal court sitting
in Louisiana could be given no greater binding effect in subsequent
Louisiana litigation than the judgment of a Louisiana state court.0 8
The reason given? Since the case was grounded in diversity, 0 the
federal court's proceedings
were had in accordance with the forms and course of proceedings
in the State courts. It is apparent, therefore, that no higher sanctity
or effect can be claimed for the judgment of the Circuit Court of
the United States rendered in such a case under such circumstances
than is due to the judgments of the State courts in a like case and
under similar circumstances.70
What seemed so "apparent" to Justice Bradley in Dupasseur that he
cited no supporting authority is less clear to a modern reader. Un-
doubtedly his conclusion was influenced by the provisions of the Con-
formity Act then in force. Since all the rules of practice and procedure
of the federal courts were the same as those of the states in which they
65. 283 U.S. 522 (1931).
66. Id. at 524.
67. Id.
68. See pp. 745-46 supra.
69. However, see note 20 supra.
70. 88 U.S. at 135.
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sat,71 a federal judgment quite naturally would bind the same parties
(this was the issue in the case) as would be bound by a state judgment.
Crescent City Live Stock Co. approached the same limit from the
other side, mandating that federal judgments not be given less effect
in subsequent state court litigation than were state court judgments.
7 2
Hancock National Bank v. Farnum"3 repeated these conclusions, but
in a different context. Suit had been brought in a Rhode Island state
court on a judgment from a federal court in Kansas. The issue was
whether the federal decision (that a corporation owed a specific debt)
was binding upon an assessable shareholder (one whose potential
liability did not lapse with the exhaustion of the company's assets) even
though the shareholder had not been joined as a party in the original
suit. The Court found the answer in Kansas law governing the scope
of Kansas state judgments. It then said: "The fact that this judgment
was rendered in a court of the United States, sitting within the State
of Kansas, instead of one of the state courts, is immaterial . . .
In explanation the Court merely cited to Crescent City Live Stock
Co."5 This was the state of affairs in 1900. The rule was clear, but the
reasons given differed.
There the matter seems to have slumbered, at least at higher ap-
pellate levels, until the great change of 1938, when the implementation
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the nearly simultaneous
decision in Erie overthrew previous patterns and expectations. This
transformation opened the second stage of the doctrine of full faith
and credit mentioned above. Federal practice came to differ from that
of nearly all the states, and the earlier arguments for recognition of
federal judgments based on conformity lost their force.
Judge Goodrich appears to have been the first to notice the effect
of this change, albeit imperfectly. In Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Inter-
national Harvester Co.,76 decided in 1941, International had conducted
the defense of an action brought against another company for patent
infringement in federal district court in Nevada. In a second suit for
infringement, this time against International itself in a federal district
71. See C. WRIGTrr, supra note 16, at 256-57. But see note 20 supra.
72. See pp. 747-48 supra.
73. 176 U.S. 640 (1900).
74. Id. at 645. Professor Paul Carrington has suggested that the proper basis for this
decision is found not in Kansas's law of res judicata but in its business corporations act.
See Carrington, Collateral Estoppel and Foreign Judgments, 24 OHIO ST. L.J. 381, 383
(1963). This conclusion seems to confuse a substantive rule, which perhaps Rhode Island
should follow, with an adjudicative determination which Rhode Island was obliged to
honor under full faith and credit.
75. See 176 U.S. at 645.
76. 120 F.2d 82 (3d Cir. 1941).
757
The Yale Law Journal
court in New Jersey, Caterpillar urged that International was barred
by its earlier unsuccessful (and concealed) defense in Nevada. Judge
Goodrich saw that the answer was far from obvious in the light of
recent developments:
An interesting intellectual question is presented concerning the
theoretical basis for the effect to be given the judgment of a
federal court in Nevada in a federal court in New Jersey.77
The holding of the case is inconclusive; the decision is obsolete and
implicitly overruled. But the analysis remains fundamentally im-
portant. The court considered first the possibility that "the question
[was] essentially one of faith and credit."78 Since Erie had left little
scope for a federal general common law, Goodrich reasoned, the scope
of the judgment had to be determined by the law of some state. Under
Hancock National Bank, that lawgiver had to be Nevada, in which the
original federal court sat.79 "On the other hand," his opinion went on,
the case involved a federal adjudication tendered in another federal
court.
[T]he matter here is one between two courts of the same sov-
ereignty, the United States of America. If one federal court
failed to give effect to the judgment of another federal court the
Supreme Court of the United States, as the head of the judicial
system of the United States would compel it do so because "they
are many members yet but one body."8' 0
Although not citing it, the court must have meant that Baldwin would
require that conclusion.
The holding in Caterpillar Tractor does not conclude whether the
common sovereignty of the two federal courts gives rise to a federal-
ized rule on the scope of judgments, for Judge Goodrich found that
the same result would occur under the law of preclusion of Nevada
and of the federal courts. He did note, however, that Judge Biggs, a
member of the panel, thought that faith and credit did not apply.,
What was the American Law Institute doing in the area of res
judicata around the time of Erie-faithfully restating the law? Two of
its works are pertinent. The Restatement of Judgments, issued in 1942,
77. Id. at 85.
78. Id.
79. "A judgment rendered by a federal court is entitled to the same faith and credit
as one rendered by the court of the state where it is sitting." Id.
80. Id. at 86.
81. "Judge Biggs believes ...that the recognition in one federal court of the decrees
of another comes through the fact that both courts are arms of the same sovereignty." Id.
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treats in considerable detail the credit to which judgments are entitled,
but "deals primarily with the effect of a judgment in the State in
which it was rendered and only incidentally with the effect in other
States."8' 2 One turns to the original Restatement of Conflict of Laws, is-
sued in 1934, only to be left uncertain as to whether it was intended to
cover federal judgments at all. The only seemingly applicable provision
is Title C, Res Judicata and Merger, § 450, discussing the "Effect of
Valid Foreign Judgment," which indicates that the issues decided by
a judgment and the parties bound by it are "determined by the law
of the state where the judgment was rendered."8 13 The Comments and
Illustrations are phrased wholly in terms of state practice. There is no
separate mention of federal adjudications. Still, the rule was an ac-
curate restatement because, as has been shown, before 1938 the scope
of a federal judgment was determined by the law of the state in which
it was rendered. Yet nothing in either Restatement denies the pos-
sibility that comprehensive federal principles, derived from existing
law, might govern the effect of all judgments in all courts.
Before reviewing the case law subsequent to Caterpillar Tractor, it
might be well to consider a question neither asked nor answered by
Judge Goodrich and not reached by the Restatements: Why should
Nevada law have any influence on the effect of a judgment for patent
infringement, a subject of exclusive federal jurisdiction? What does
it matter what Nevada might wish to do in an area in which the state
has no power to act? In defense of Judge Goodrich, it should be noted
that he offered the suggestion that the state rule on judgments must
prevail only as a possibility. But he developed it with enough clarity
to attract many followers, while the other possibility-that the problem
should be solved by considering only the structure of the federal courts
themselves-is expressed obscurely, although I believe it is ultimately
sounder.
Judge Goodrich's view of the possible consequences of Erie for the
recognition of judgments did not survive, at least not in cases of ex-
clusive federal jurisdiction. In Heiser v. Woodruff,8 4 where a federal
diversity judgment was filed as a claim in bankruptcy, the Supreme
Court said: "It has been held in non-diversity cases, since Erie v.
Tompkins, that the federal courts will apply their own rule of res
82. RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS, Scope Note, at 2 (1942). To the same effect and more
explicit is R ESTAT.M1ENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS 20 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973). It restricts
itself to "the res judicata effects of a judgment upon later actions in the courts of the
same State. Effects in the courts of a sister State are dealt with in Restatement (Second)
of Conflict of Laws §§ 93-121."
83. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 450, at 533-34 (1934).
84. 327 U.S. 726 (1946).
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judicata."8 5 At least in matters of exclusive federal jurisdiction there
is no need even to measure the force of the authorities cited by the
Heiser Court;86 the existence of a distinctly federal rule of res judicata
in cases of exclusive federal jurisdiction was reconfirmed in 1971 by
Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Founda-
tion.s 7 Like Caterpillar Tractor, Blonder-Tongue was a patent in-
fringement suit. 8 The holding-that mutuality of parties is not re-
quired for collateral estoppel-relies exclusively on federal policy and
attaches no importance whatever to the law of the state in which the
first patent suit was brought.
Williamson v. Columbia Gas & Electric Corp., 9 decided by the
Third Circuit in 1951, marks the beginning of the third stage of evolu-
tion. Two suits had been brought in the federal district court in Dela-
ware. They involved the same parties and rested on substantially the
same facts, but one invoked the Sherman Act and the other the Clay-
ton Act. Without even a passing inquiry about whether Delaware law
would allow a claim to be split when it was supported by two different
legal theories, Judge Goodrich advanced an expanded rule of res
judicata to preclude the second action. He justified the change from
the older rule of allowing narrowly posed single issues to constitute
separate causes of action by citing a "modem" preference for disposi-
tion of the whole controversy between parties.90 For present pur-
poses, the importance of the decision is not that Judge Goodrich chose
to be modem, but that he perceived res judicata as a distinctly federal
problem, not in any way dependent upon the law of the state in which
the federal court sat.
The shift marked by the Williamson case is significant and takes
into account another major development occurring around 1938-the
end of conformity and the adoption of independent federal rules of
procedure under the Rules Enabling Act.9 1 In Williamson, after ex-
plaining that older views on splitting causes of action had been shaped
85. Id. at 733.
86. Jackson v. Irving Trust Co., 311 U.S. 494, 503 (1941); Sunshine Anthracite Coal
Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 403 (1940).
87. 402 U.S. 313 (1971).
88. The specific issue in Blonder-Tongue was slightly different from Caterpillar
Tractor: whether a party who had litigated and lost could relitigate against another
plaintiff an issue resolved in the prior proceeding.
89. 186 F.2d 464 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 921 (1951).
90. Id. at 470.
91. The Conformity Act of June 1, 1872, ch. 255, 17 Stat. 196 was repealed in 1934 by
the Rules Enabling Act, ch. 651, 48 Stat. 1064 (now codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1970)).
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by the then prevailing law on pleading and joinder, Judge Goodrich
stated that the principle of disposing of the whole controversy be-
tween parties "pervades the modern systems of pleading, especially the
federal system, as exemplified by the free permissive joinder of claims,
liberal amendment provisions, and compulsory counterclaims." 92 What
provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure speak to the prob-
lem of preclusion? Most importantly, Rules 13(a) and 41(b): the
former precludes subsequent litigation of a counterclaim arising out
of the same transaction as the main claim, except under stated cir-
cumstances; the latter provides that a dismissal of an action is to be
deemed to be an adjudication on the merits (thereby precluding
further action) unless the dismissal order otherwise specifies.
There are fully established lines of decision on both of these rules
that the federal determination is binding not only in other federal
courts but also in the courts of the states. For the counterclaim rule, it
is enough to mention London v. Philadelphia,93 where the Penn-
sylvania supreme court held that a party was precluded by prior litiga-
tion in a federal court in which the party could have asserted a
counterclaim, but did not.94 The nearly uniform course of state court
decisions accepting preclusion of counterclaims not timely made as a
matter of substantive federal law is adequately chronicled elsewhere. 95
The settling effect of a federal dismissal with prejudice is also fully
established. The first decision is that of Judge Medina in Kern v.
Hettinger," a case originating in the Southern District of New York.
The plaintiff had previously sued one of the defendants in federal
district court in the Northern District of California on the same claim,
and the suit had been dismissed there under Rule 41(b) for want of
prosecution. Kern argued that the California dismissal was without
prejudice because that would have been the effect of dismissal in a
California state court. Judge Medina replied:
92. 186 F.2d at 470.
93. 412 Pa. 496, 194 A.2d 901 (1963).
94. Id. at 499, 194 A.2d at 902. The basis of the holding is not entirely clear, but
the court appears to treat the res judicata effect as a matter of substantive federal law:
We realize that Pennsylvania state court trials are not bound by federal court
procedural rules. But, this is not now a matter of procedural rules, but rather the
application of substantive law. The principle of res adjudicata is controlling.
Id. at 500, 194 A.2d at 902. Accord, Home v. Woolever, 170 Ohio St. 178, 163 N.E.2d
378 (1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 951 (1960).
95. See 6 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1417, at 102
(1971) ("[S]tate courts generally have adopted the approach of treating the barring effect
of the rule as substantive and have declined to hear any claim not pleaded in a prior
federal action as required by Rule 13(a)."); Comment, supra note 5, at 108-10.
96. 303 F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1962).
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We disagree. One of the strongest policies a court can have is
that of determining the scope of its own judgments.... It would
be destructive of the basic principles of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure to say that the effect of a judgment of a federal court
was governed by the law of the state where the court sits simply
because the source of federal jurisdiction is diversity. The rights
and obligations of the parties are fixed by state law .... But we
think it would be strange doctrine to allow a state to nullify the
judgments of federal courts .. . .The Erie doctrine . . . is not
applicable here; and the judgment in favor of [this defendant] is
affirmed.97
A similar effect can be attributed to Rule 15, dealing with amend-
ment, and Rule 18, dealing with the permissible joinder of claims. An
illustration is Glick v. Ballentine Produce, Inc.,98 although the discus-
sion therein is inadequate. In earlier litigation, the plaintiffs had sued
in an Arkansas federal court for damages for wrongful death arising
out of a collision in Missouri, seeking recovery under Arkansas com-
mon law. The action was transferred to Missouri where the district
court ruled that Missouri law applied and that the plaintiffs failed
to state a claim under that law; the court gave leave to amend, but
the plaintiffs elected to suffer a dismissal under Rule 41(b), which
was stated to be "with prejudice." 99 On appeal the dismissal was
affirmed, and their petition for certiorari denied. 00 Thereafter, they
began a second action in Missouri federal court under the Missouri
wrongful death statute, which they had deliberately foregone earlier
because that statute was least favorable for their recovery. The action
was dismissed on a plea of res judicata, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed,
holding that a dismissal with prejudice was a ruling on the merits
both under Rule 41(b) and the Missouri rules.' 01
Perhaps the case is only another application of Rule 41(b). More
important, however, is what was not said. What claims are precluded
by dismissal? Is it only those actually stated and dismissed, or also
those one might have added by amendment but elected not to? The
Eighth Circuit might have looked to Missouri law for the answer, but
it did not. Implicit in the case is the determination that what con-
97. Id. at 340. Accord, La Societe Anonyme des Parfums Le Galion v. Jean Patou,
Inc., 495 F.2d 1265, 1275 (2d Cir. 1974) ("This would be so whether the suit were
treated as being based on diversity of citizenship or federal question jurisdiction." (ci-
tations omitted)); Gambocz v. Yelencsics, 468 F.2d 837, 840 (3d Cir. 1972).
98. 397 F.2d 590 (8th Cir. 1968).
99. Glick v. Ballentine Prod., Inc., 343 F.2d 839, 840-41 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 891 (1965).
100. Id.
101. 397 F.2d at 592.
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stitutes a single claim is determined solely by federal law and that a
plaintiff's failure to make use of Federal Rule 15 (allowing the amend-
ment of pleadings) so as to state a valid claim bars any subsequent
action.
It can also be suggested that Rule 23 on class actions clearly con-
templates a uniform federal rule on who is bound by such a suit. Al-
though class actions always have been recognized'0 2 as an exception to
the general rule that only named parties to an action are bound, Rule
23, as amended in 1966, moved further yet-establishing that even in
class actions in which members of the class are united in interest
only by the presence of common questions in their claims, they are
bound unless they affirmatively opt out of the suit.10 3 And courts
appear ready to uphold this principle. 04
To the extent, then, that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do
speak about the preclusive effect of federal adjudications, they speak
authoritatively, and determinations based upon them are entitled to
res judicata effect or full faith and credit.10 5 They have been given
that effect by state and federal courts alike.
What happens, however, on matters of res judicata where the Su-
preme Court has not exercised its rulemaking power under the En-
abling Act? Can the federal courts, lower as well as Supreme, adopt
theories of res judicata which are different not only from their own
prior rules on these subjects but also from those of the states in which
the rendering court sits?
I noted at the outset of this article that four developments in the
past generation have left the federal law of res judicata uncertain. The
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have been discussed, and Erie is at
least partially disposed of. What of the other two-the changing con-
ception of the scope of a cause of action and the relaxed views about
mutuality of estoppel first announced by the California Supreme
Court in Bernhard?'00 Neither of these is treated in the Federal Rules.
Certainly there are holdings, explicit and implicit, that federal
courts can create rules on the scope of a cause of action (what issues
have been decided, even if not actually litigated) and on the parties
102. See Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921).
103. See 7A C. WRiGrT & A. MILLER, supra note 95, § 1789 (1972).
104. See In re Four Seasons Sec. Laws Litigation, 493 F.2d 1288 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1034 (1974); Note, Collateral Attack on the Binding Effect of Class
Action Judgments, 87 HARv. L. REv. 589 (1974).
105. There is support for this principle in Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965). See
C. Wawarrr, supra note 16, § 59.
106. Bernhard v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d
892 (1942).
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bound by an adjudication. The Williamson case10 7 is one example;
the court was clearly influenced by the overall tenor of the Federal
Rules, but did not apply any particular Rule. Rule 18, allowing free
joinder, is most nearly on point; but it only permits and does not com-
pel. Williamson introduced a principle of compulsory joinder, a rule
against splitting claims into as many causes of action as there are
legal theories to support recovery on the same set of facts. Much the
same can be said of Glick. 08 Rule 15 permits amendment, but does
not purport to require amendment. Only judicial construction in light
of broader policy prevents splitting claims and compels one to amend
when the opportunity is afforded.
Not surprisingly, it has been in diversity cases that federal courts
have been least confident of their power to declare a general federal
rule of res judicata. The Glick case, applying a federalized rule of
compulsory amendment, arose under straight diversity jurisdiction, but
the court did not address the possible limiting effect of diversity juris-
diction. Where courts have perceived the problem, it has been a source
of confusion, as is revealed in two airline disaster cases. One is United
States v. United Air Lines, Inc. 0 9 where a district court was specially
constituted as a court for the District of Nevada and the Eastern Dis-
trict of Washington, but eventually tried the case in the District of
Nevada because the air collision sued upon had occurred there. After
an extensive trial involving large claims, a jury found United Air Lines
liable for the death of many passengers. Thereafter, representatives of
the remaining passengers moved for summary judgment on liability,
which was granted. The trial court found it difficult to decide which
law of mutuality applied, but settled upon that of Nevada; it concluded
that the collateral estoppel rule was substantive and that Nevada, as
the site of the collision, was the proper source for substantive law."10
Wishfully, the court found that Nevada had abandoned mutuality as
early as 1916, long before the Bernhard revolution, and then ad-
vanced the more comforting authority of Bernhard itself, which
Nevada presumably would have followed in any event."' Despite this
reliance on state law, there is at least an intimation that the judge
considered the matter one of federal law, for he collected federal cases
107. See pp. 760-61 supra.
108. See p. 762 supra.
109. 216 F. Supp. 709 (D. Nev., E.D. Wash. 1962), ajf'd sub nom. United Air Lines v.
Wiener, 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.), cert. dismissed under S. Ct. R. 60, 379 U.S. 951 (1964).
110. 216 F. Supp. at 726.
111. Id.
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holding that the requirement of mutuality no longer prevailed in
federal courts.112
Another puzzling opinion is Berner v. British Commonwealth
Pacific Airlines, Ltd.,"1 3 a case brought in the Southern District of
New York for the wrongful death of a passenger who died in a crash
near San Francisco. The trial judge directed a verdict against the air-
line on the basis of a prior California federal court judgment in favor
of the survivors of another passenger on the same flight. On appeal,
the Second Circuit first distinguished its own decision in Zdanok v.
Glidden Co." 4 that dispensed with an absolute requirement of mu-
tuality: "Zdanok involved two federal court cases resting on federal
question jurisdiction. We have two federal court cases here, but in
both jurisdiction rests on diversity of citizenship.""1 5 "[I]n light of
the radiations of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins," the opinion went on, the
court "might properly look initially to New York law," which then still
required mutuality."1 6 The circuit court finally saved itself from a
difficult choice by finding, on dubious grounds, that the results under
the federal, New York, and California rules were all the same."17
The Third Circuit has faced the same problem. It had early rejected
the requirement of mutuality in cases involving federal questions.
However, in Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Lumbermens
Mutual Casualty Co.,"18 a diversity case, the court ruled that it was
bound to apply Pennsylvania law on collateral estoppel (which also
rejected mutuality) to a prior Pennsylvania federal judgment. What
seems the most recent and most difficult case from the Third Circuit
is Williams v. Ocean Transport Lines, Inc."x9 A longshoreman sued a
port commission in diversity in the federal district court for New
Jersey and simultaneously sued the shipowner in admiralty in federal
district court in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Liability was not
seriously in dispute. The New Jersey judgment was rendered first,
with a verdict for $90,000. Not satisfied with the amount, the plaintiff
pursued his Pennsylvania action seeking greater damages. The in-
surance company representing both defendants raised the defense of
collateral estoppel in the Pennsylvania federal court. The court noted
a number of possible solutions to the choice of law problem. One
112. Id. at 728.
113. 346 F.2d 532 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 983 (1966).
114. 327 F.2d 944 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 934 (1964).
115. 346 F.2d at 539.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 541.
118. 411 F.2d 88 (3d Cir. 1969).
119. 425 F.2d 1183 (3d Cir. 1970).
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might look to the law of New Jersey to determine the preclusive effect
of the earlier judgment, since it had been rendered by a federal
diversity court sitting in New Jersey-as we have seen, this was once
the iron-clad rule. Or instead, one might look to "the law applicable
to the second suit to determine what preclusionary effect should be
given in that suit to the first judgment."' 20 The choice of this second
alternative would not, however, end the inquiry: one still would have
to determine whether "the law applicable to the second suit" was the
law of the forum state, because of Erie, or whether the federal court
was "free in the light of federal considerations to apply its own rule."'121
After an extensive and sophisticated discussion of the principles in-
volved, the court looked to federal policy:
Where so substantial a federal interest is involved as the multi-
plicity of claims arising out of seamen's and longshoremen's ac-
cidents, a federal court should be able to decide for itself whether
or not a greater preclusionary effect may be given to a prior judg-
ment than would be given in the state of the first forum ...
This same consideration eliminates the necessity for looking to
Pennsylvania law, at least where the second action asserts federal
subject matter rather than diversity jurisdiction.122
This approach to the resolution is unnecessarily complicated. Further,
it is wrong. Instead of engaging in the dubious inquiry whether "feder-
al interests" were "substantial" enough to justify giving greater effect to
the prior adjudication "than would be given in the state of the first
forum," the court should simply have ruled that the scope of the New
Jersey diversity judgment was necessarily determined by federal law,
not New Jersey law.
So bold an assertion may call both for authority and some explana-
tion. One recent decision, Aerojet-General Corp. v. Askew,' 23 holds
unqualifiedly that there is a federal rule against splitting claims (in
this instance failing to raise a federal defense when it could have been
asserted) and that the question of what parties are bound by a judg-
ment is also federal in nature. There had been federal litigation over
the validity of an option held by Aerojet to buy certain public lands.
This first suit was in a federal diversity court, although there existed
120. Id. at 1187.
121. Id. at 1188.
122. Id. at 1189-90 (emphasis added). One commentator has criticized Williams's use
of a federal rule giving greater faith and credit to a judgment than would be given in
the state of rendition, suggesting that it would have been preferable to "anticipate" New
Jersey rulings loosening the old requirement of mutuality. 56 VA. L. Rav. 1483, 1485
(1970).
123. 511 F.2d 710 (5th Cir.), appeal dismissed and cert. denied sub nom. Metro-
politan Dade County v. Aerojet-General Corp., 423 U.S. 908 (1975).
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a potential defense that invoked a federal question (whether the op-
tion was invalidated by a Florida statute later enacted, or whether
such invalidation would violate the contracts clause). The only de-
fense pleaded and tried was failure of consideration. Thereafter, the
same issues were raised between different parties in a Florida state
court. An injunction was sought in federal court, under federal ques-
tion jurisdiction, to prevent further prosecution of the Florida ac-
tion. 24 The party opposing the injunction claimed that the scope of
the earlier federal diversity judgment was governed by Florida case
law. The district judge apparently conceded that Florida law defined
the scope of the federal judgment. 25 The Fifth Circuit held, however,
that "federal rather than state standards are applicable":
Federal law clearly governs the question whether a prior federal
court judgment based on federal question jurisdiction is res
judicata in a case also brought, as this one was, under federal
question jurisdiction, We believe the same result obtains where,
as in this case, the first suit was brought only under diversity
jurisdiction. The federal doctrine of res judicata bars relitigating
any part of the cause of action in question, including all claims
and defenses that were actually raised or could have been raised.' 26
In addition to the question of what claims were foreclosed by the
first judgment, there was a problem of parties. A state land board had
been the party defendant in the original federal litigation. Dade
County, which wanted to purchase the land and had a priority under
the challenged Florida statute, argued that it could not be bound by
litigation to which it was not a party. To this contention also the
court found an answer in federal law:
Under the federal law of res judicata, a person may be bound by
a judgment even though not a party if one of the parties to the
suit is so closely aligned with his interests as to be his virtual
representative.127
124. The issue of full faith and credit is usually raised by suing on a judgment as an
obligation or by pleading it in bar. But it is established that a federal court may enjoin
the bringing of a state action when a prior federal judgment would constitute a bar.
This is deemed within the exception to the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970),
permitting a federal court to enjoin state proceedings when necessary "to protect or
effectuate its judgments." See, e.g., Cliett v. Hammonds, 305 F.2d 565 (5th Cir. 1962); Lee
v. Terminal Transp. Co., 282 F.2d 805 (7th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 828 (1961).
Would a state decision denying a plea of res judicata or full faith and credit be a final
order prior to trial on the merits and be subject to certiorari under 28 U.S.C. § 1257
(1970)? A persuasive argument that it is was made in Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at
2-6, Hughes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 336 A.2d 572 (Del.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
841 (1975).
125. 366 F. Supp. 901, 908 (N.D. Fla. 1973).
126. 511 F.2d at 715 (footnote omitted).
127. Id. at 719.
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The court concluded that identity of interest was principally a ques-
tion of fact and did not disturb the trial court's finding.
Aerojet-General deserves to be admired, but not beatified. In one
of the footnotes there is the dubious suggestion that, although the res
judicata effect of federal judgments is a matter of federal law, collateral
estoppel may somehow be determined by the law of some state.128 Yet
once established, as it has been, that the full faith and credit statute
does apply to federal judgments, there seems to be no reason to select
among the res judicata features, measuring some by federal law and
others by state law. Another footnote advances the view that where a
federal court judgment based on diversity jurisdiction is pleaded as
res judicata in a subsequent state court action, the law of the original
forum state would govern as to whether the federal judgment has
preclusive effect.129 This was an attempt to limit the holding of Aero-
jet-General to instances where federal judgments are pleaded as res ju-
dicata in subsequent federal suits, thus seemingly preserving the au-
thority of Dupasseur'30 and Crescent City Live Stock Co.' 31 In fact, as
has been shown, those cases have been superseded by the development
of independent federal rules of procedure1 3 2 They are not good state-
ments of the emerging law, and would be better abandoned than
distinguished. Federal judgments should be given the "same full faith
and credit in every court . . . as they have by law or usage" in the
court of rendition.
1 33
The argument in support of this conclusion is abstract, and requires
a cautious statement. At its root is the constitutional provision that
the federal judicial power extends only to cases and controversies. To
decide a case or controversy implies some binding effect. A judgment
or decree that lacked finality would constitute something other than
128. Id. at 716 n.8. One of the cases discussed is Berner v. British Commonwealth
Airlines, Ltd., 346 F.2d 532 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 983 (1966). See p. 763
supra.
129. [A]voiding state court bias is a major purpose of diversity jurisdiction and an
important reason for applying federal law to determine whether a prior federal
court diversity judgment is res judicata in a subsequent diversity case. It should be
noted that our holding accomplishes that purpose without intruding into the
legitimate domain of state law under the Erie doctrine. Where a federal court judg-
ment based on diversity jurisdiction is pleaded as res judicata in state court, the
danger of state court bias causing untoward effects on the integrity of federal court
judgments is minimal. If bias were a problem one party or the other would have
filed the suit in federal court or removed it there. Accordingly, state law has been
held to govern whether a federal court diversity judgment is res judicata in a sub-
sequent state court action.
511 F.2d at 717-18 n.9 (citing Dupasseur and Crescent City Live Stock Co.).
130. See pp. 745-46, 756-57 supra.
131. See pp. 747-48, 757 supra.
132. See, e.g., p. 761 supra, note 140 infra.
133. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1970) (emphasis added).
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an exercise of the judicial power.13 4 If that principle be accepted
(and it has rarely been denied), it seems inappropriate that some other
sovereignty-the states-should have ultimate authority to determine
what binding effect the judgment has and on whom.
There may have been merit, when the Conformity Act prevailed, in
following, within limits, state law on the effect of judgments. The
proper scope of judgments is determined in large part by the pro-
cedures leading to their rendition. Thus it was not unreasonable to
declare that federal judgments should have the same scope, neither
more nor less, as judgments rendered by the courts of the states
wherein they sat, if only as a matter of Congress's power to regulate the
jurisdiction and procedure of federal courts. But the time of con-
formity is past. Except by special incorporation of state law, federal
procedure under the Rules is independent of the states. That there is
still some deference to state law cannot be denied. Rule 4, which serves
to define who may be bound by a federal adjudication, partially in-
corporates state methods of service of process. But in the absence of
such restraints, federal law (judge-made when the Rules do not speak)
should prevail. The specter of Erie should be banished from this realm.
The ultimate reason for this conclusion is that it is in the nature of
the judicial power to determine its own boundaries. This principle
was recognized by Judge Medina in Kern v. Hettinger,3 5 in the very
context we are considering here: "One of the strongest policies a court
can have is that of determining the scope of its own judgments."' 3 6
Without that power it is less than a court. The clear thrust of the
Constitution is that courts created by the Congress are courts in the
fullest historical sense of the word. It is for that reason that we need
not look to see whether Congress has enacted an explicit rule on judg-
ments, 37 or even delegated a power to do so. The only possible limita-
tion of federal courts' power to give force to their own adjudications
would arise if the Congress had acted affirmatively and unequivocally
134. See generally P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO S H. NVECHSLER, supra note 16,
at 85-102.
135. 303 F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1962). See pp. 761-62 supra.
136. 303 F.2d at 340.
137. Though there is no federal legislation on the res judicata effect of judgments,
Congress has legislated on a collateral problem. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1962 (1970), a federal
judgment has the same lien effect as a judgment of the state in which the federal court
sits. Missouri had once attempted to place a slightly onerous but eminently reasonable
burden on federal judgments-requiring by statute that a federal judgment be docketed
in county records before it became a lien on land located in that county. The Supreme
Court emphatically denounced this attempt to give any lesser effect to a federal judg-
ment than would be given to one of a Missouri court, which became a lien upon
rendition. "Merely approximate conformity with reference to such a subject matter will
not do, especially where complete conformity is entirely possible." Rhea v. Smith, 274
U.S. 434, 442 (1927).
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to reduce it. Perhaps the Congress could, but that issue need not be
faced until an attempt is made. None has been. 138
Except in Aerojet-General, the questions just discussed concerning
the issues foreclosed and the parties bound by a federal judgment
arose in a purely federal-to-federal context. What have state courts
done when federal judgments from the same state are tendered before
them as claims or defenses? Not infrequently they simply cite their own
decisions on what issues are precluded or parties bound. 39 This is not
surprising; for 100 years, since Dupasseur and Crescent City Live
Stock Co., the Supreme Court has held that the scope of a federal
judgment is determined by the law of the state in which it was
rendered, and it has yet to declare that this is no longer the law. Still,
in the period following the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, state courts confronted with differences in procedures that
might affect who was bound or what was decided have often deferred
to the federal rule.
140
Even on matters not covered by the Federal Rules, some state courts
have felt bound to give the same preclusionary effect to federal judg-
ments as would a federal court-even where similar preclusion by
wholly domestic judgments would be distasteful. Thus in Shell Oil Co.
v. Texas Gas Transmission Corp.,' 4' a Louisiana court accepted "with
extreme reluctance" what was to it the foreign doctrine of collateral
estoppel because it "is included within the full faith and credit man-
138. To treat the effect of diversity judgments as a matter amenable to rulemaking
by the federal courts is not inconsistent with the .ommand of the Rules of Decision Act
that the "laws of the several states . . . be regarded as rules of decision." 28 U.S.C.
§ 1652 (1970). By the terms of the Act, state rules of decision are applicable only where
there is no constitutional or statutory requirement to the contrary, and only "in cases
where they apply." That the power to decide the force of federal adjudications is, in
extremis, a defining element of Article III judicial power gives reason to find that even
in less extreme instances the laws of the several states do not "apply" within the terms
of the Rules of Decision Act itself.
139. See, e.g., New Orleans & N.R.R. v. Gable, 252 Miss. 605, 611, 172 So. 2d 421, 423
(1965); Williams v. Miller, 58 N.M. 472, 478, 272 P.2d 676, 680 (1954); McCarthy v. State,
I Utah 2d 205, 207, 265 P.2d 387, 389 (1953).
140. See Hathcock v. Mitchell, 277 Ala. 586, 593-94, 173 So. 2d 576, 583 (1965) (co-
defendants in prior federal action who had not cross-claimed are not barred because cross-
claims are only permissive under Rule 13(g)); Gish Realty Co. v. Central City, 260
S.W.2d 946, 951 (Ky. CL App. 1953) (co-defendants who had cross-claimed in prior
federal case were bound even though Kentucky law did not utilize cross-claims). See also
Salazar v. Murphy, 66 N.M. 25, 340 P.2d 1075 (1959) (federal court's dismissal with pre-
judice of third-party complaint because of plaintiff's failure to prosecute does not bar
plaintiff's action in state court against a third-party defendant; complaint in prior federal
action could not be treated as amended under Rule 15(b) to include claim against third-
party defendant, because there had been no trial on the merits).
141. 176 So. 2d 692 (La. Ct. App. 1965).
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date of the statute [28 U.S.C. § 1738]."142 In Thompson v. D'Angelo,143
the Delaware supreme court extended the Third Circuit's rule (itself
erroneous) on federal-federal preclusion to a federal-state context, giv-
ing the same collateral estoppel effect, per Provident Tradesmens
Bank, to a decision of the federal district court for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania "as would be given to it by a Pennsylvania Court."1 "4
A final question relating to federal judgments tendered in state
courts arises in connection with pendent jurisdiction. The doctrine
was first established, in a narrow form, during the 1930's.' 45 This may
again have been an accident of timing, but it is certainly no accident
that pendent jurisdiction has been expanded since, and that claims
which once could not be pleaded pendent to a federal cause now can
be.' 46 This development parallels the broadening of the scope of a
cause of action described by Judge Goodrich in Williamsonl4T and, in
greater detail, by the tentative drafts of the Restatement (Second) of
Judgments.14 There is one seemingly unassailable holding in regard
to preclusion of pendent claims, by the supreme court of Pennsylvania
in London v. Philadelphia'49-that if a state cause of action is a com-
pulsory counterclaim within pendent or ancillary jurisdiction in a
federal suit, -it is barred in all subsequent litigation, even though it
was not presented. In London, however, the assertion of the counter-
claim was made compulsory by Rule 13(a).150 Does a similar rule apply
to the splitting of claims in instances where joinder is permissive?
142. Id. at 696-97. On rehearing, the decision was vacated on the ground that the
issue on which preclusion had been applied was one of law rather than of fact. There is
an excellent treatment of the case and the problem in 40 TUL. L. REv. 934 (1966).
There have been suggestions in the literature that collateral estoppel (issue preclusion)
is less rigidly incorporated into full faith and credit than is res judicata (claim preclusion).
See Carrington, supra note 74; Note, Sentencing in Cases of Civil Disobedience, 68 COLUM.
L. REV. 1590 (1968).
143. 320 A.2d 729 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974).
144. Id. at 734.
145. Hum v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238 (1933). See C. WRIGHT, supra note 16, at § 19.
146. See United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 721-29 (1966); 13
C. WRIGHT & A. MILLFR, supra note 95, at § 3567.
147. See pp. 760-61 supra. In United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715,
724 (1966), the Supreme Court used language strikingly similar to that of Williamson,
explaining its expansion of pendent jurisdiction: "Under the Rules, the impulse is toward
entertaining the broadest possible scope of action consistent with fairness to the parties;
joinder of claims, parties and remedies is strongly encouraged." Id. at 724 (footnote
omitted).
148. § 61 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973).
149. 412 Pa. 496, 194 A.2d 901 (1963). See p. 761 supra.
150. Fm. R. Civ. P. 13(a) reads in part:
A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim which at the time of serving
the pleading the pleader has against any opposing party, if it arises out of the
transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim
and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the
court cannot acquire jurisdiction.
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Would a party who was able to assert both a federal claim and a pen-
dent state claim in federal court be barred by failure to bring the
pendent claim in the federal proceeding? There are few cases on
point,' 51 and the problem ultimately leads to a theoretical exploration
of the differences between res judicata and full faith and credit.
From the perspective of res judicata alone there should be no pre-
clusive effect. In the presence of two independent systems of courts,
federal and state, one would be reluctant to extinguish a claim in one
simply because it was not brought in joinder in the other. The high
value placed by the modem law of preclusion on avoiding relitigation
of the same facts operates at most as an argument of good policy, and
not of legal compulsion. Compulsory joinder is a fairly new procedure.
In light of traditional practice, allowing the separate litigation of un-
joined noncompulsory claims can hardly be a denial of due process to
defendants. Those ancillary jurisdiction cases which emphasize the
right of the federal courts to be free of the burden of relitigation miss
the point-the federal courts will in fact be entirely spared.1' -2 The
states would bear the burden; and if they are willing to, no federal
policy is violated.
It has to be the principle of full faith and credit which is at stake
if London v. Philadelphia is correct, and if the rule relating to com-
pulsory counterclaims is to be extended to bar causes which could have
been permissively joined but were not. If the rule of bar extends to
such claims or defenses, it cannot be justified by conventional invoca-
tions of economy, efficiency, and expediency. It will have to be placed
151. Belliston v. Texaco, Inc., 521 P.2d 379, 382 (Utah 1974) ("Under United Mine
Workers v. Gibbs, the federal district court had the judicial power in the instant case
to hear plaintiffs' state claim of unlawful price discrimination. Since plaintiffs failed to
assert their state claim when the federal court had the power to adjudicate it with their
federal claim, they are barred under the doctrine of res judicata from litigating these
issues in the instant action." (footnotes omitted)); Ford Motor Co. v. Superior Court, 35
Cal. App. 3d 676, 680, 110 Cal. Rptr. 59, 62 (Ct. App. 1973) ("As its federal claim was sub-
stantial and Cartrade could and should have sued for both federal and state relief in its
earlier federal [antitrust] action, its failure to do so constituted splitting of its one cause
of action."); Brady v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 274 A.2d 146 (Del. Super. Ct.), ajj'd per
curiam, 282 A.2d 620 (Del. 1971); Martin v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 455 S.W.2d 429, 437
(Tex. Civ. App. 1970) (alternate holding); Woods Exploration & Producing Co. v.
Aluminum Co. of America, 438 F.2d 1286, 1315 (5th Cir. 1971) cert. denied, 404 U.S.
1047 (1972) (dictum). But cf. Hughes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 336 A.2d 572 (Del.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 841 (1975).
152. In Great Lakes Rubber Corp. v. Herbert Cooper Co., 286 F.2d 631 (3d Cir.
1961), the court explained its retention, as a counterclaim under ancillary jurisdiction, of
a claim that originally had been dismissed for lack of diversity: "The tests are the same
because Rule 13(a) and the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction are designed to abolish the
same evil, viz., piecemeal litigation in the federal courts." Id. at 633-34. It is hard to see
how the federal burden is lessened by taking cases it would not otherwise handle; per-
haps it is doing the state a favor that the state does not especially want done for it.
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forthrightly on the ground that the integrity of the federal judicial
power is at stake, and that the scope of a federal judgment is deter-
mined exclusively by federal law-whether declared by Congress or
judge-made.
I referred earlier to the American Law Institute's treatment of the
problems discussed here.153 To the extent the original Restatement of
Conflict of Laws intended to cover federal judgments at all, it treated
them under the general rubric of "foreign judgments." Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws includes federal judgments only slightly
more explicitly.' 4 The current provisions are both short and essential
enough to be set out in full:
§ 93. Recognition of Sister State and Federal Court Judgments
A valid judgment rendered in one State of the United States must
be recognized in a sister State, except as stated in §§ 103-121.
§ 94. Persons Affected
What persons are bound by a valid judgment is determined, sub-
ject to constitutional limitations, by the local law of the State
where the judgment was rendered.
§ 95. Issues Affected
What issues are determined by a valid judgment is determined,
subject to constitutional limitations, by the local law of the State
where the judgment was rendered.
If this is a true "restatement," it is difficult to read it other than as
saying that the pre-1900 decisions dissected above remain good law
today. Those rules are more than a generation obsolete. A different
rule is emerging today, and an even stronger one will prevail in the
future. It will read something like this:
A valid judgment rendered in any judicial system within the
United States must be recognized by all other judicial systems
within the United States, and the claims and issues precluded by
that judgment, and the parties bound thereby, are determined by
the law of the system which rendered the judgment.
153. See p. 759 supra.
154. Section 2, Comment c of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICr OF LAWS (1971)
appears expressly to exclude "Federal-State Conflicts" as a topic "not dealt with directly
in the Restatement of this Subject." It is hard, however, to ignore the explicit reference
to federal judgments in the catch-line of § 93, the more so because of the total silence
of the original Restatement on federal matters.
